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LIABILITY VERSUS RESPONSIBILITY IN SPACE LAW:
MISCONCEPTION OR MISCONSTRUCTION?

Frans G. von der Dunk
International Institute of Air and Space Law, Leiden University,
The Netherlands

~

The relation between the two legal notions of 'responsibility' and
'liability' in space law has never been dealt with in a comprehensive
fashion. The paper sets out to do this, although the problem turns out
to be too complex to really realize that goal. First it goes back to those
notions as they are dealt with in general international law, where their
relation has indeed been a topic for discussion and research. The
notions are analyzed with three key concepts as guidelines: the
indispensable criteria for each of the notions to become applicable; the
role of 'due care' as a special problem regarding attributability in each
of the two cases; and the consequences once the respective notions are
found to be applicable.
This analysis leads to the conclusion, that the traditional construction
of the two concepts in general international law is a misconstruction.
The International Law Commission's efforts at redefinition of the
concepts indeed manages to avoid this misconstruction, however, at the
cost of creating a misconception.
Transferred to space law, analysis of the two notions along the same
lines leads to the conclusion that here the traditional construction is
followed, with only a minor improvement relating to the 'due care'
concept. The consequences of this misconstruction are then indicated,
. and claimed to be not merely of theoretical and academic importance.
On the other hand, it is argued that application of the ILC's
misconception to space law would not solve those problems either. For
these reasons finally a much more simplifying option is proposed,
which would mean, however, in space law as well as in general
international law, a radical change, or rather amendment to the existing
rules in those respects, read Articles VI and VII of the Outer Space
.Treaty as to outer space.

1. Introduction: responsibility vs. liability?
'Responsibility' and 'liability' are two important terms in international
law pointing to two fundamental principles; space law does not differ in
this respect. Thus, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967,1 the
Magna Charta of space law, speaks of the international responsibility of
states for national activities in space to be in conformity with the treaty,
and another article, Article VII of the same treaty, of the liability of
states for damage towards other states or their nationals or property.
The two principles seem nicely divided, no link or relation established,
no trouble arising.2 Thus, if states fear that they run a risk of having to
pay as a consequence of some space activity under their authority
having gone wrong, they take a careful look at Article VII and the
ensuing Liability Conventions, and that would seem to suffice.
On closer look, however, the two principles seem far less completely
and clearly independent from and unrelated to' each other than
suggested, although most authors on space law do not seem to be very
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much aware of the fact - or care. Yet, already the fact that both the
French and the Spanish languages - after all, both authentic languages
as far as the Outer Space Treaty is concerned!4 - have only one term
for the two notions ("responsabilite" and "responsabilidad" respectively)
should warn of such carelessness.5 And when one considers
furthermore that Article VI defmes the activities for which anyone
state exactly can become responsible differently from Article VII's
definition of the activities for which anyone state exactly can become
liable, and a discussion is already going on for many years about how
exactly to interpret the vague definition of Article VI - in the sense of
Article VII, or indeed not? - one indeed starts to wonder: is there
some kind of misconstruction or misconception at play here? After all,
"[a]n inaccurate use of terminology may sometimes be of but little
importance, and discussion of it may be merely a quibble. But accuracy
of expression becomes important when it appears that inaccuracy is
due to a confusion of thought in the understanding or application of
proper rules or principles of law." B
2. The starting point:
responsibility in general international law
When analyzing the problem thus coming to life one should start with
general international law. Space law is really only a lex specialis when
compared to the much older body of general international law, being
derived from it as far as practical with an eye to the peculiarities of
space as a realm of law of its own. Hence, international law provides a
general background to the problem of responsibility and liability as it is
in regard of space law as well, and helps interpreting that lex generalis
where it is not clear or elaborated enough. Articles I and III of the
Outer Space Treaty incorporate general international law even for the
larger part explicitly in the body of space law?
Let us therefore first take a look at the two principles as dealt with
under international law in its more earthly configuration, and especially
as dealt with by the International Law Commission, the authoritative
organ established by the General Assembly of the UN to codify and
develop public international law.8 The ILC, to be sure, also wrestled
with the problem already from the beginning,S and decided to deal
with the two topics by way of two different sets of draft articles to be
developed and ultimately presented to the General Assembly as treaties
ready for signature and ratification by states. The subject of state
responsibility was the first to be tackled, the First Report on the
subject being completed by the ILC in 1969.
Essential for the topic as it will be dealt with in regard of space law
are the following three elements of the concept. State responsibility,
first, means responsibility for "internationally wrongful acts,,'0 towards
another state. The two decisive criteria for state responsibility to arise
are therefore that "a breach of an international obligation of the
[responsible] State" in respect of the second state has taken place,
which is called 'objective fault',ll and that that breach "is attributable
to the [responsible] State under international lavl'.12 In other words,
two elements which in many domestic legal systems are (additionally)
indispensable criteria for defining a wrongful act do not count on the
international level: the element of subjective fault or "culpa", in the
sense of knowingly or even purposefully violating a rule,'3 and the
element of damage. The mere attributable breach of an international
obligation, without subjective fault and without damage (whatever the
exact definition and scope of that term), is already enough to incur
state responsibility.14
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In this respect it must be added that the question of breach of an

international obligation is in each particular case to be answered by
reference to the relevant legal relation between the states involved, i.e.
by finding out what treaty or customary rules, and sometimes also
general principles of law, do apply.15
As a second element for our analysis however, a special problem
concerning the question of attributability indeed is much more relevant.
A state is respousible for "acts of the state", however defined but
always involving (a degree of) state authority through some state organ
or another, whereas it can not be held responsible as such for acts of
private persons done in a private capacity.16
The exception here is provided for by the famous principle of 'due
care' (or 'due diligence') responsibility, meaning a state can incur
responsibility in case of private acts taking place on its territory or
being perpetrated by its national, and amounting to violations of
international obligations, if the state could reasonably have prevented
such acts. 17 This is the logical consequence of the jurisdiction of a
state over its territory (through the territorial sovereignty principle) and
its nationals, natural or juridical (through the active nationalityprinciple): 18 a duty to use this jurisdiction as far as reasonable to
prevent other state's rights from being infringed.
Thirdly and finally, another important aspect of the doctrine of state
responsibility must be mentioned. To be sure, the ILC has not yet
finished the part of its Draft articles dealing with this aspect, which
deals with the consequences of state responsibility once it has arisen.
Instead therefore we must summarily look at customary law as it has
developed to a great extent in this field, and numerous judgements of
courts and tribunals. Most famous among the latter of course is the
Chorz6w Factory Case, decided by the PCIJ in 1928.19
A breach of an international obligation incurring state responsibility
according to customary law and jurisprudence can be repaired (the
Chorz6w Factory judgement speaks of "reparation") theoretically in
three ways.2O The first and most logical way is that of restitutio in
integrum, i.e. of undoing the wrongdoing and restoring for the full
100% the preexisting situation. If restitutio in integrum is considered
impossible (for instance, if damage has arisen as a consequence of the
breach which turns out to be irreparable, such as the death of
nationals) or senseless (for example in the case of nationalization of
foreign assets), compensation, usually in monetary form, is an accepted
substitute. That compensation is conceptually a substitute is clear from
the fact that compensation-in-full should in fact be of such value as to
equal the value of the damage done: compensation therefore being in a
sense not restitutio in integrum in actual value but in theoretical,
monetary value. The third form of reparation finally is satisfaction, for
instance by way of official apologies. This kind of reparation is
especially relevant in cases where no material damage has occurred as
a consequence of the breach, such as by the mere intrusion of foreign
aircraft in the sovereign airspace of another state.
3. The confusion:
liability in general international law

Then as to liability in general international law. Here, immediately
confusion starts, already with respect to the term itself taken in
isolation.21 The term 'liability', just as the term 'responsibility', is an
age-old term; in contrast however to (state) responsibility, liability is
derived for a large part from domestic legal orders. Perhaps this
already accounted for this first measure of confusion. An almost
uniform element however could at least be found in the close relation
of liability to the concept of damage.22
Consequently, also international liability is closely related to damage;
the ILC's praft articles as they are being developed on this topic
starting from the First Report of the ILC presented in 1980, only
confirm this. Here we arrive at the first fundamental element of
definition also dealt with in respect of international responsibility and
fmd it to be radically different here, for damage is on the contrary
indeed an indispensable criterion for liability to arise - as can already
be deduced from the provisional title of the ILC's Draft articles,23 but
also from the numerous other treaties in international law dealing with
liability.24
Damage however, although not an indispensable criterion for
responsibility, is far from unimportant in that concept, and it is here
that more confusion arises due to the resulting partial overlap with

liability. An internationally wrongful act namely can lead to damage or
consist itself of the causing of damage,25 in other words and in actual
fact, damage is most often an important element in defining existence
of an internationally wrongful act. Thus, in cases of acts by one state
causing damage to another state, its nationals or its property, both
principles can become involved at the same time, with all due
consequences. This became already clear in cases of transboundary
environmental pollution, where the causation of damage or harm
through pollution to another state's territory (and not the actual activity
causing the harm) was the quintessence of the violation of an
international obligation not to do so.
The ILC evaded this problem by moving towards a definition of
liability where the concept of liability would only apply for damage
arising out of acts not in violation of international law, excluding any
overlap.26 The element of breach, of objective fault, which had to be
present in the case of responsibility, had to be absent in order to
invoke liability. In a negative way, breach thereby became an
indispensable element of liability also. As under 'traditional' liability the
question of breach had been irrelevant, the ILC seemed to act
clarifyingly by thus nullifying the overlap.
At the same time however another kind of confusion is actually created
by this drawing of a firm borderline. For in that case, damage in case
of an internationally wrongful act would be dealt with under the law of
state responsibility, and damage in other cases by liability, whereas it is
often very hard to precisely determine whether damage would be
allowed if paid for (i.e., a case for liability) or whether damage would
be illegal and this illegality would have to be redeemed by paying for it
(i.e., a case for responsibility).
It becomes a matter then of how the obligation in dispute was exactly
phrased, and the point is that one can phrase almost every obligation
both as: you are allowed to do it, provided you pay for it, and as: you
are not allowed to do it, so if you still go ahead, you'll have to pay for
it. Are semantics to fulfil such a central role here?
Here we have already entered into discussion of the third element of
analysis, concerning the consequences of liability when compared to
responsibility. Whereas state responsibility theoretically can be
redeemed in three different ways, (international) liability knows only
one kind of redemption: payment of compensation for the damage.27
Liability thus, in contrast to responsibility, was seen as a primary
obligation under the ILC's definition, arising without need for a (prior)
violation of a(nother) primary rule of international law, and being
instead the simple consequence of damage.28 The consequence of
liability thus was, as simply, the duty to wipe out the liability itself, by
repairing the damage.29
The borderline drawn by the ILC between liability and responsibility,
by means of defining them as primary respectively secondary
obligations, however, is purely artificial. If the primary obligation, to
pay for damage under liability-rules, would not be fulfilled, the
secondary obligation to repair for this wrongful act of non-fu1filment of
an international obligation to pay would come into play - logically
consisting of a duty to pay for the damage by way of monetary
compensation! Compensation could include so-called punitive
damages,SO whereas these would be excluded under liability because
there would have been no violation of an international obligation which
was to be punished for. At what point furthermore, in time or
otherwise, the primary obligation becomes the secondary obligation,
unless specified in treaties on liability,31 can only be a matter of
arbitrariness.
An extra complication could moreover arise if damage would mean
different things under the two different principles, in the sense e.g. of
including or excluding immaterial or indirect damage. All in all, the
ILC thus perhaps manages to prevent the confusion of liability and
responsibility, however at the cost of having two clearly different
concepts whose alternative application depends on a non-existing
borderline and is thereby far from clear.
Finally the second element of analysis as dealt with in relation to
responsibility, of the special problem related to attributability,32 the
question of due care obligations, must be dealt with here. In respect of
state responsibility, in a sense the doctrine of due care forms a certain
divergence from the general theory, perceived by the ILC as being
objective; objective fault being no criterion. Here "fault or negligence
becomes an element of state responsibility simply because the due care
obligation itself requires negligent conduct before this obligation can be
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said to have been breached".33 Thus, "Draft Article 23 [containing the
due care with respect to state responsibility] ( ...) embraces all sorts of
primary duties in the category 'to prevent an event''',34 and therefore
due care is itself a secondary obligation as defined by the ILC.
When turning to liability, the ambiguity once more becomes clear.
Here, due care must be seen as a primary duty to prevent harm and
damage as the consequence of acts of persons under its jurisdiction
- where according to the ILC the mere fact of harm arising already
means that the duty has been violated, that the "care" taken was less
that was "due". That means, that even if maximum care would have
been taken, as soon as damage occurred the due care obligation would
have been violated,35 which of course makes the use of the word "due"
superfluous and hollow, and effectively turns due care liability into
some kind of risk liability. Thus, it really shifts the attributability: where
under the doctrine of state responsibility a state can only become
directly responsible for its own acts, and due care responsible for
private acts only if it failed to take due care, under the doctrine of
international liability a state is obliged to pay as the liable entity, no
matter whether it concerns damage arising out of its own acts or out or
private acts, and even if the state in question had taken all reasonable
measures in the latter case to try to prevent such damage from arising!
Both state responsibility and international liability for non-state acts
can concern persons as well as territory under the jurisdiction of the
state in question. Therefore, the ILC's borderline is necessary to
prevent overlap where responsibility, potentially leading to a duty to
repair by means of monetary compensation, could be taken away when
due care was proven, but where liability, potentially leading to a duty to
pay for the damage, could not be excused.
At the same time of course, it suddenly makes the semantic analyses of
how exactly a certain international obligation was phrased, of far from
academic importance - and the fact, that the ILC's creation of a
distinction by speaking of primary and secondary obligations turned out
to be an arbitrary and therefore by definition non-legal distinction, a
fundamental practical problem. For whether a state is according to a
certain rule to be held liable for damage resulting out of a perfectly
legal act (and has to pay for that damage), or to be held responsible
for a breach of international law resulting in damage or itself consisting
of the infliction of damage (and has to provide reparation for such
damage in the form of compensation) can now make all the difference,
if responsibility and liability are invoked in respect of acts perpetrated
by its nationals or from its territory. The best example under
international law once more is the field of environmental pollution
emanating from within a certain state's territory: since the famous Trail
Smelter Arbitrationoo the borderline between environmental harm that
could be bought off and thus was allowed if only compensated for, and
enviroumental harm that amounted to an international wrong for which
compensation was due, has tend to get lost time and again during
analysis.s7

No breach but damage finally would invoke liability, with the duty to
compensate as a necessary corollary.
On closer look, however, the problem turned out to only have been
shifted by creation of the matrix, not solved. It remained semantics, as
the precise formulation of the relevant rule would provide for the
decision whether to apply responsibility or liability, which in the case of
damage could lead to the same kind of obligation in terms of paying
for the damage yet to different outcomes as to what damages would in
the end have to be paid. At the same time, the artificial borderline
drawn by the ILC between liability and responsibility turned out to be
even more arbitrary itself, which of course compounded that problem.
And finally, these conclusions turned out to be more than academic, as
an analysis of the problem of responsibility and/or liability for non-state
acts, by means of due care, made clear that under responsibility states
could be exempted from paying for damage if they have proven due
care to try to prevent the damage arising on the hands of their
nationals or emanating from its territory, whereas under liability states
have to pay for damage as soon as it arises, even if they had done their
utmost to prevent it.
The ILC has thus perhaps managed to avoid the misconstruction of
liability and responsibility as two overlapping concepts, without
borderlines and not easily distinguishable while being presented as if
they were, which creates a lot of confusion by making it possible
sometimes to apply two different but intricately interlinked notions to
the same case - with different and therefore conflicting results. On the
other hand and at the same time, this turns out to be at the cost of the
misconception that having two clearly distinguishable concepts would
solve the problem as their alternative application would thereby
become clear, whereas in actual fact this alternative application turns
out to hinge on semantics and vague or even non-existing
borderlines. The two concepts therefore could still lead to
fundamentally different results in respect of cases of damage, especially
as far as non-state activities would be concerned.
Damage would still need to be paid for in the case of state activities,
whether as compensation for an internationally wrongful act or as
consequence of established liability. Even here, however, different
concepts of damage in regard of responsibility and liability respectively
could lead to different results. A thorough analysis of the semantic
problem (being the basis of the problems resulting from the ILC's
approach), in order to conclude in each case of international damage
whether responsibility or liability should take account of that damage,
and which could possibly rectify the misconception, has meanwhile
become impossible due to the traditional misconstrnction whereby both
terms have been used for decades almost interchangeably in many
cases and at any rate undefined most the time, by courts and expert
authors as well as by treaty-negotiating governments and treaty-making
diplomats.
5. The starting point:
liability in space law

4. The ILC's matrix:
misconstruction or misconception?

Now we leave this earthbound realm and enter into the lofty arena of
space law, where of course responsibility and liability are also two
fundamental, mnch discussed principles. This time it is easiest to start
analysis with liability, which is in regard of space law (and in contrast
to general international law) the most elaborated of the two principles
as a special Liability Convention40 was devoted to develop the
provisions of Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty.
Article VII, of course, itself provides the basis. States are
internationally liable for damage41 to other States, their property or
persons, as far as caused by the former States' space objects - which
for our purpose may be considered for a moment as being equal to
damage resulting from an activity in space. As to the necessary
ingredients for space liability, this leads us to the same conclusion as in
respect of international liability: damage is the only, indispensable
criterion,42 nor breach of an international obligation (objective fault),
nor subjective fault in the sense of intent or negligence are necessary to
invoke liability - in respect of damage on the earth or to an aircraft to
begin with.43
Things at ftrst sight seem to lie differently in respect of damage
inflicted in space, to (another) space object,44 (which means it only
relates to part of the liability-under-space-law concept) where fault

The ILC's effort to use the term 'liability' exclusively for acts not
prohibited as such under international law indeed draws a clear
borderline between cases where responsibility was involved and those
involving liability - in theory. This distinction was illustrated by the
provisional title of the Draft articles on International liability as
proposed by ILC Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter,3S and supported by the
incorporation of the rule that acts precluding wrongfulness under the
doctrine of state responsibility did not thereby exclude liability for
damage, damage which then must have been considered to be
consequential to an act as such not unlawful.s9
In effect, it created a definitional matrix, which could become the new
rule in respect of general international liability if the scheme is to be
continued in the final draft. The matrix would build upon damage and
breach as the two relevant criteria, in each case attributability really
being taken for granted. An act of a state involving no breach and no
damage would be no problem, international law would not become
involved any further. A breach but no damage would invoke
responsibility, with the reparation in any case not being of the
compensation type. A breach and damage also would invoke
responsibility, this time the reparation at least including compensation.
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seems to playa role. For liability-purposes, the assessment of relative
fault on the hand of the state inflicting the damage when compared to
the state whose object is damaged (and most probably the states
involved are both victim and inflictor of damage) is important. It is on
an altogether different level however, namely between two participants
in the same business, that it becomes relevant, and it has nothing to do
with a breach of an international obligation, with objective fault;45 and
in effect it also does not have therefore the impact of making subjective
fault a necessary criterion. The fault meant here, is not intent or
negligence in respect of a rule of international law,46 but intent or
negligence to cause damage in respect of someone else active in space;
hence, it becomes relative to the fault of that other someone active in
space. Fault in respect of damage inflicted in space is automatic, is a
given circumstance once two space objects have created such damage,
only its relative division between two (or more) space actors involved is
a matter for debate; whereas the fault alluded to under the previous
analysis is one that can very well be absent as a whole. It therefore
actually has not the effect here of creating or denying liability, only of
making a difference in regard of the consequences of liability, its
division between two states involved in a space accident, once it has
arisen - namely as to the amount of damage which should be
compensated for in respect of each other. This liability therefore really
is of another kind, constituting a sort of inter-party liability as opposed
to third party liability where innocent third parties are supposed to
suffer.47
Article III of the Liability Convention is confusingly drafted in this
regard, stating liability sunnnarily to exist "only if the damage is due to
its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible". That could
only mean, however, that in case of "shared" fault, as we are dealing
here with accidents in outer space, the liability exists to the extent of
the share - which really is tantamount to saying that damage to each
other has to be compensated for only to the extent of the share;
liability under Article III becomes a measure of quantity instead of a
qualitative principle, with relative application.48 As explained, one fault
or other has to be present for the accident in question to arise; Article
III divides liability according to this kind of fault among the parties
involved, it does not change the 'total' of fault or the 'total' of liability
present, it only deals with how they are to be apportioned.
Likewise, the absolute liability of Article II of the Liability Convention
can be exonerated and changed into liability based on fault when, and
to the extent that, it can be established under Article VI(l) that "the
damage has resulted either wholly or partially from gross negligence or
from an act or omission done with the intent to cause damage on the
part of a claimant state or of natural or juridical persons it represents".
This confirms the aforementioned conclusion of liability being used as a
quantity, as this phrase effectively turns the
damage-on-earth-or-in-the-air-cases also into cases of inter-party
liability, the third party no longer being an innocent party. Once more,
breach is not relevant for the distinction between absolute and
fault-liability, not even SUbjective fault with regard to the breach. Only
subjective fault in respect of the damage is relevant, and this by
defmition means that it has become relative to the fault of the other
party. So, liability as a qualitative principle exists for damage,
independent of breach or subjective fault; only in cases where the other
party must be deemed to have been at fault, too, does another kind of
fault come into play, to "divide" the liability or more accurately of
course the consequences of that liability according to relative fault.
Meanwhile we have already arrived at the issue of the consequences of
liability. The Liability Convention is clear in this respect: the state
found liable for the damage will have to pay for it, "in accordance with
international law and the principles of justice and equity, in order to
provide such reparation in respect of the damage as will restore the
person (...), State or international organization (...) to the condition
which would have existed if the damage had not occurred".49 This
formula presupposes full compensation for the damage as the.
consequence of liability, which can only mean that liability indeed
relates to the total amount of damage, and not to any part of it. The
damage can not suddenly be less, when it turns out that fault was
'divided' between the relevant parties; so it should not be the liability
which is thereby considered diminished, but the consequence of that
liability.
While the use of the term "reparation" and the fact that the height of
the amount to be paid for the damage is determined by what real

restitutio in integrum would cost, seem to point confusingly towards
elements of state responsibility under general international law, it may
safely be said for the moment that the consequence of liability for
damage under space law, being solely the duty to pay for the damage,
is in line with the consequence of international liability as traditionally
defined by general international law,5O where also real restitutio in
integrum and satisfaction are excluded. Thus, breach or no breach of
space law, if damage occurs, one has to pay for it.
Finally as to the problem of attributability in relation to due care: as
ouly states (and international organizations) can become liable under
Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention, the
question arises for what kind of acts they are liable, especially for what
kind of non-state acts. Much has been written about this subject,51
wherefore a sunnnary suffices. Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty
together with Article I(c) of the Liability Convention provide for a
famous fourfold definition of a "launching state", which is the liable
state for the damage caused by the space object in question. Only one
of the four ("a state which launches") points exclusively to an act of the
state, the other three could very well (partially) include non-state acts
for which the launching state(s) still can be held liable.
What must be noted especially here is again the similarity to the
traditional concept of international liability which on this point has
been duly elaborated by the ILC's Draft. For the application of liability
it makes no difference, under the fourfold definition of "launching
state", whether the launch was in many aspects a private activity or
completely a state affair. As soon as damage occurs, it has to be paid
for, and no amount of due care taken in respect of private activities
cansing the damage can excuse the launching state in this respect.
Once more, the term "due care" seems to be not really appropriate.
Sunnnarizing, liability under space law has, as much as under
traditional general international law, damage as its sole criterion (apart
from attributability of course); neither subjective fault (culpa, intent,
negligence), nor objective fault (i.e. a mere breach of law) are
necessary for liability to come into play. Logically then, the two other
elements of analysis do not differ either: the ouly consequence of
liability is the duty to pay for the damage, and due care liability is not
so much contingent upon due care as it is contingent upon damage.
Thus, space law in regard of liability as a whole does not conform to
the ILC's matrix, but rather to the traditional concept of international
liability. The consequences of adhering to that misconstruction will
become clear when we now turn to responsibility as it exists in space
law.
6. The confusion:
responsibility in space law

Of course, responsibility in space law bases itself upon Article VI of
the Outer Space Treaty,52 which makes states internationally
responsible for national space activities. The term 'responsibility' is
used in this very basic principle of space law in the same sense as in
general international law, as it is being codified at the moment by the
ILC, because it is added that states are responsible for these activities
to be in conformity with the rules of the Outer Space Treaty (and
therefore to the whole body of space law which after all is an extension
and elaboration of this treaty) and international law; in other words,
with the lex specialis of space law and the lex generalis of public
internationallaw.53
International state responsibility, in space law as much as elsewhere,
therefore arises in case of activities .being in violation of relevant legal
obligations, those being primary obligations of (space) law.54 It is thus
dependent, to begin with, on the fIrst criterion, that of an
internationally wrongful act. Damage (as much as subjective fault) is
not a criterion, although here as much as elsewhere damage is not
excluded either. The overlap arising out of the misconstruction thns will
already become apparent.
The second criterion necessary for state responsibility is also included
in Article VI: the question of attributabili~, and thereby we arrive at
our second element of analysis. This is taken care of by the formula of
"national activities in outer space", whatever its precise definition;
Article VI itself only speaks of national activities as being either
activities of "governmental agencies" or of "non-governmental entities".
It is in as far as the latter is concerned, that the question of due care
responsibility arises. In deviation from the general law of state
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responsibility, states here however are directly responsible for non-state
activities, instead of merely due care, as no difference is made by
Article VI in respect of the kind of responsibility to be applicable in
the case of "governmental agencies" on the one, respectively
"non-governmental entities" on the other hand.58
This smacks of the "due care" liability, both under space and under
general law, as even if the "care" taken is found "due", responsibility will
not thereby cease to exist. One effect of the misconception created by
the ILC's matrix, in the sense of creating a difference between due care
responsibility and due care liability in this respect, at least has been
prevented in space law. Neither under responsibility, nor under liability
are states able to dodge a potential duty to pay for damage by claiming
to have taken due care, whereby the question of whether to apply the
one or the other becomes of less practical relevance. An exception,
however, already exists here in respect of remote sensing activities,
where international responsibility apparently only applies for state
activities,57 and classical due care shonld take care of non-state
activities.
Nevertheless, in view of the familiarity of due care responsibility for
private activities either personally or territorially emanating from within
the state's jurisdiction with the responsibility arising under Article VI
for activities of non-governmental activities, linked as it is to the duty of
authorization and continuing supervision by "the appropriate state"
implying such jurisdiction, this may help to solve the longstanding
discussion on what should be read by "national activities" and "the
appropriate state".58 In this light, national activities must be deemed to
encompass both activities by nationals, whether natural or juridical and
activities undertaken from within the territory of the state in
question.59 Responsibility can arise for the appropriate state to the
extent that those activities thns fall under its jurisdiction, for which
authorization and continuing supervision as provided for by Article VI
are a sort of minimum requirements.eo
This definition of national activities of course implies that in respect of
a specific activity there can be more than one appropriate statenamely to the extent that jurisdictions overlap; this problem of
concurrent jurisdiction however exists in general international law as
well, and various methods and techniques exist there to solve it. We
need not go into that problem any further, suffice it to state here that
not following this line of reasoning would both seem unlogical, and not
solve the problems when the comparison with liability is made - if it
not even leads to more problems.
For this reason we now turn to the third element of analysis, the
consequences once state responsibility has arisen. Article VI itself is
silent in this respect, therefore one cannot do anything else than to
turn to general international law once more to look for an explanation.
Here, we arrive once more at the doctrine of reparation: whatever the
violation of space law invoking a state's responsibility, this responsibility
can only be taken care of by restitutio in integrum, compensation
andlor satisfaction. What is, in any actual situation, the right form of
reparation of course depends on the content of the (primary) rule
violated and the extent of the violation.
One could imagine for instance that a violation of the rule that the
ownership of property like a satellite is not affected by its presence in
outer space,61 by capturing the satellite with a space shuttle, can be
redeemed by restitutio in integrum, meaning release and restoration of
the satellite to its former place (the question of potential material
damage taken apart). Likewise one could imagine that the violation of
the right to freely exploit and use outer space,62 for example by claims
of the underlying state that a satellite circling at thonsands of
kilometres above the earth falls under its sovereign jurisdiction, should
be redeemed by the third possible form of reparation, satisfaction, for
example by official apologies (once more assuming that no material
damage had taken place).
The crucial point is what happens if damage does arise. Satisfaction
will not be enough, either restitutio in integrum, logically costing the
state providing for it the full amount necessary to restore the damage,
or (monetary) compensation which allows the state suffering the
damage to restore that damage to the full - and thus, conceptually and
theoretically, involves the same amount of money - is necessary. Thus,
states could suddenly find themselves under an obligation to pay for
damage under Article VI, even if they have domestically arranged for
complete coverage of the situations falling under Article VII of the
Outer Space Treaty and the whole of the Liability Convention63 - or if

they have taken the basic 'precaution' of not signing the Liability
Convention while being a party to the Outer Space Treaty.
For this latter situation to be problematic, of course it has to be
presumed that the Liability Convention has not become customary law
to the same extent as the Outer Space Treaty through being a more
elaboration of the latter'S Article VII, thus effectively turning Article
VII into a mere statement of principle. That would, of course, for
fairness' sake, make Article VI a statement of principle to just the
same extent (and it may well be so, as the Outer Space Treaty is very
often referred to also as the 'Principles TreatY); but where Article VII
and the Liability Convention would be really necessary for creating
liability-rules in space, a fmding that Article VI would be a mere
principle could not prevent the application anyhow of the fundamental
doctrine of state responsibility as developed under general international
law. Thus it would indeed make a difference.
7. Conclusion: confusion or a third approach?
What that means, becomes clear when we again take into account that
the misconstruction as it existed has been maintained in space law; the
overlap has not been deleted. In other words, why is it important, for
instance, that states under space law can become liable for damage
arising, having to pay for it, while at the same time they can become
responsible for a breach of space law involving this same damage,
seemingly meaning they have to pay for it - again. Of course, the
damage should not be compensated for twice, once under the heading
of state responsibility, once under the heading of international
liability.64 The misconstruction however would seem to point exactly in
that direction. If logic would prevent it nevertheless, what would then
be necessary? Should one choose? Luckily enough, the problem
regarding due care at least would not be important for such a choice
under space law as it would have become under general international
law. The field of environmental pollution will not pose basic problems
in this respect; in other words, it does not matter so much whether
privately caused pollution leads to due care responsibility or to due
care liability.
Uuluckily, however, the same does not hold good in respect of the
definitions of damage. Damage regarding liability is pretty well-defined
in space law;65 damage as a component part of state responsibility for
space activities however is not. It could include, in contrast to the
former, other forms of immaterial damage, indirect damages, or even
punitive damages. It remains important therefore to decide on
application of the one or the other - and this is exactly what the
misconstruction turns into a haphazard and arbitrary affair.
Moreover, so far we have considered only cases where damage would
fall, in principle, under both categories. What, however, if the damage
could arise outside of the liability-rules, yet invoking the
responsibility-rules? After all, in space law the scope of the one is
defined rather differently from the scope of the other, Article VI and
Article VII (of course as elaborated by the Liability Convention) do
not (automatically) cover the same cases. If Article VII does not
completely cover all possible Article VI-cases, states may suddenly fwd
out they have to pay compensation for damage (even if caused by
non-state, private acts) on account of responsibility where they thought
they covered the whole range of possibilities by heeding Article VII
and the Liability Convention.
Thus, it is necessary to look once more at the definition of 'national
activities' and 'appropriate state'. If the definition of 'appropriate state'
would completely coincide with the definition of 'launching state' as
provided for, the problem of overlap at least would have been
relegated to the realm of theory.
If it were indeed to coincide however, an explanation would be
necessary for the fact that 'activities' can become so remotely linked to
a launching state that it would make little sense to link responsibility so
directly to a launch (although the same would hold good for liability to
a large extent as well); that responsibility in space law ouly covers
activities in outer space, where liability in space law includes launchings
as far as taking place on earth also (and even launchings that never
really leave earth) and trajectories through air spaces following the
launchings66; that Article VI and Article VII most assuredly use
different language67; and most important, why a specific concept of
liability as different from responsibility would be needed - when its
cases would turn out to be almost completely covered by the other
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concept. Thus, the misconstruction would continue in the sense of
creating confusion whether to apply one or the other of two different
but intricately interlinked and partially overlapping concepts to one and
the same case, with potentially conflicting results as e.g. to (the amount
of compensation due for) the damage. And here again the field of
environmental pollution would be a special example of these problems,
the borderline between damage, allowed-if-paid-for, and damage, not
allowed and thus to be compensated, being undiscernible in this field.
The difference between Articles VI and VII of the Outer Space Treaty,
between "appropriate state" and "launching state" was elaborated
before, being based on the logical interpretation of "national activities"
as arising out of general international law. In this light, it is however
certainly still possible for states to claim damages under the heading of
state responsibility in cases where they can not do so under the heading of
international liability. One need not even think of future spaceplanes or
space stations to which notions of 'launching' and 'launching state' may
no longer be found to, or decided upon not to apply; one can think of
all space activities by non-governmental entities with respect to space
objects launched from launch sites outside of territory or facilities of
the state to which those entities belong and without that state procuring
the launch or launching herself.as Those activities, of course, very well
fit into the notion of 'national activities'.
Therefore, perhaps the matrix of the ILC is to be preferred: liability,
Article VII and the Liability Convention only becoming invoked as long
as the damaging activity in itself is in conformity with international law,
in other cases damage remaining to be redeemed through
compensation for internationally wrongful acts. Apart from all the
other difficulties with such an approach as analyzed before, once more
especially the fact that the misconstruction that had arisen for the first
time by the drafting of the Outer Space Treaty has taken root so
forcefully through the Liability Convention itself, will however prevent
the ILC's matrix from becoming reality. And even if that were not the
case, it would make the matrix malfunctioning by creating
misconceptions, as the borderlines between application of the one or
the other principle would depend on semantics and vague or
non-existing borderlines - and the Liability Convention to a large extent
would become useless!
Perhaps then, finally, it would be the best idea to amend the Liability
Convention in order to widen its scope to all activities one way or
another under the jurisdiction of an appropriate state, and delete the
notion of launching state as far more activities then suggested or
perceived can involve possible damage under space law where the
actual link to the launching seems very remote. By thus making the
jurisdiction of a state the pivotal point of attribution, the second
element of analysis, that of atttributability including due care, would
have been taken care of.
At the same time, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty should be
elaborated to the extent that for material damages, recourse would
have to be had to Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty plus the
Liability Convention, whereas for other kinds of damages, including the
immaterial damage caused by the mere violation of a legal obligation of
one state towards another, Article VI itself then would remain effective
to the extent of providing for possibilities of restitutio in integrum,
compensation for non-material damage (including for instance punitive
damage) - which need not be monetary compensation - and
satisfaction. This would solve the problems arising from the third
element of analysis, that of the consequences of responsibility and
liability.
It is the other way round from what the ILC's misconception would
suggest - which would amount to a need for equalizing the appropriate
state to the launching state - whereas it would solve the present
misconstruction: liability would not become a different principle, it
would become part of the principle of state responsibility, taking care
of all the latter's cases where (material) damage occurs. This, finally,
would take care of the first element of analysis, that of the difference
in constituent elements of the respective notions of responsibility and
liability. At the same time it would turn around the ILC's method of
construction in another sense than previously alluded to as well, for it
would make rules of liability secondary, (or perhaps 'subsidiary' is a
better word) to rules of responsibility instead of the other way
round.Bs By making liability a subprinciple of responsibility namely, it
would simply become applicable only once responsibility has already
been found to be involved, as the main trigger, and, as a second

criterion, read secondary trigger, material damage was seen to be
involved.The fundamental doctrine of 'sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas', famous under general international law,70 would step in to
make causation of harm or damage from within one state's jurisdiction
to another state's territory, property, nationals, or nationals' property,
as such an international wrongful act, triggering responsibility and, by
the very reason of causing damage, consequently liability therefore just as is already in fact more or less the case in respect of
transboundary environmental pollution.
The practicality and chance of realization of such a turnaround, both in
general international law and in space law, may be a matter for
discussion; the simplicity of this construction to my opinion preventing
both the misconstruction of space law and the misconception of the
ILC seems appealing and is certainly worth further attention.
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"specific regime" "when the inflictor of damage and the victim
participate together in a space activity".
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64.

Cf. e.g. Gorove, p. 109, when speaking of "international
responsibility for damages" (sic!).

65.

See Art. I(a), Liability Convention.

66.

Cf. Artt. II and IV (l.a), Liability Convention.

67.

See also K. Tatsuzawa, "The Regulation of Commercial Space
Activities by the Non-Governmental Entities in Space Law",
Proceedings of the Thirty-First Colloquium on the Law of Outer
Space, Bangalore, 8-15 October 1988, published Washington,
1989, pp. 341-348, at p. 344.

68.

One recognizes of course the fourfold definition of 'launching
state' invoking liability in the first place; Art. I(c), Liability
Convention.

69.

Thus, rules of liability should perhaps become 'tertiary
obligations' under international law!

70.

See supra, note 25.
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